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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 20470

PHILLIP G. SNYDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARIBG
5TATEMENT_QF_Tffi£_CASE
Defendant petitioned this Court for rehearing of an
opinion filed by this Court on July 29, 1987.

In the opinion

authored by Chief Justice Hall, defendant's conviction of theft
was affirmed.

Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable George E.

Ballif, Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Additionally, defendant was fined and ordered to pay restitution.

The facts are set forth in the Brief of Respondent
(Respondent's Brief at 1-22).

This Court in its opinion clearly recognized and
addressed defendant's argument that the statute of limitations
bad run on six of the eight theft counts. Finding that the only
theory of theft presented to the jury was that of embezzlement,
this Court determined that all criminal actions committed by
defendant were well within the statute of limitations.

Defendant has cited no new facts or principle of law
overlooked by this Court in its opinion, but instead has only
reiterated the arguments made by the parties in their briefs*

PQIN3LI
THIS COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT EMBEZZLED MONEY ENTRDSTED
TO HIM BY THE INVESTORS.
In his petition for rehearing defendant claims that the
offense of theft occurred, if at all, when he placed the
investors1 money into his own account instead of a trust account,
and that under that theory the statute of limitations had run on
six of the eight counts in the information.

Defendant argues

that the decision by this Court that defendant was guilty of
embezzlement and therefore, the statute of limitations was not an
issue, was not supported by the record• *
In Bl£HD_JU_Ei£JSflJLd r £j£DyiDS_I£illS # 4 Utah 292, 11 P.
512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for determining
whether a petition for rehearing should be granted:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown at the time of the hearing.

* The State acknowledges that in its responsive brief it agreed
with defendant that theft occurred at the time he placed the
investors1 money into his own account. Based upon this Court's
opinion, and the fact that the jury was never instructed on theft
by deception, but only the crime of embezzlement, the State
recognizes that its prior concession was erroneous.

-2-

4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted).
^ISlSQUi

In ClllDIDil)SS_JLi.

42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), this Court stated:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the
result. . . .
If there are some reasons,
however, such as we have indicated above, or
other good reasons, a petition for a
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it
is meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.

42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624.
In the opinion authored by Chief Justice Hall, 5iai£-.Yx
£jQy&£I# 62 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (July 29, 1987), (Addendum) this
Court affirmed defendant's conviction after a full and fair
consideration of defendant's argument on appeal.

This Court

clearly recognized that defendant's contention that the statute
of limitations had run on the charged offenses was without merit.
The case was presented, argued, and submitted
to the jury on the theory of embezzlement,
and no alternative or conflicting
instructions were given on the time-barred
offense of theft by deception. Defendant's
contention that the jury might have convicted
on the basis of an offense neither prosecuted
nor instructed upon is not supported by the
record and is therefore without merit.
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence relating to the specific acts of
embezzlement is similarly without merit. The
evidence was not in dispute as to the date
and the amount invested by each investor

-3-

named in the information and the date the
sums were deposited in defendants operating
account*
62 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.
It is clear from a review of defendant's brief, his
petition for rehearing, and the Court's opinion, that defendant
does not meet the necessary requirements to grant a petition for
rehearing.

Under CuMDinssr this Court should grant a petition

for rehearing only if it finds that it overlooked or misconstrued
any material facts, statute or other principle of law applicable
in the case.

Defendant has done nothing more in his petition

than repeat the arguments in his brief and the State's brief.
At trial, the State argued that the present case was a
classic example of embezzlement.
And his Honor has instructed you here in
Instruction No. 11 . . . • "When one
intentionally and knowingly appropriates
money of another lawfully in his possession
to his personal use, without permission for
such use, the offense of theft is complete.
The fact that the person intends subsequently
to return the property or money, or to make
restitution to the other, does not relieve
his wrongful act of its criminal nature,
excuse him or make his offense of theft any
the less."
•

• • •

Now, the words unauthorized control are in
the classic definition of the term
embezzlement. Now, the word embezzlement is
not used in this instructions [sic]. But I
use the word because it's one that you
understand. The term embezzlement depicts a
particular type of theft or a particular type
of unauthorized control.
And the theory of our case is the classic
example of embezzlement, is what happened in
this particular case [sic]. That is, that
Mr. Snyder came into some money lawfully. He

4-

didn't, as I said in my opening statement,
take it at gun point; he didn't sneak into
the bank at night and take the money. He
took the money lawfully with some specific
directions, and then having come into the
money lawfully, he converted it to his own
use.
(R. 1198-99) •
Theft occurs when one obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978).

Defendant's

action in failing to put the money into a trust and instead
placing it into his operating account did not, as defendant
argues, necessarily constitute theft.

There is no evidence that

at the time that defendant placed the money into his operating
account that he was exercising unauthorized control with a
purpose to deprive the investors.
indicated just the opposite.

In fact, the evidence

All expenditures by defendant from

the time he obtained the money until October 16 were for the
Temple Hills project.

62 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.

Thus, although

defendant failed to put the money into a trust, he was still
making authorized expenditures for Temple Hills and had taken no
action to permanently deprive the investors of their money.
Defendant's act in placing the money into his operating account
did not complete the crime of theft; theft was not completed
until October, 1979 when defendant started to make unauthorized
expenditures.
In order for defendant to be convicted of theft when he
failed to put the money into a trust he would have had to have
been found guilty of theft by deception; i.e. that he did not

-5-

obtain the money lawfully but instead obtained control by
misrepresenting that the money would be placed into a trust. Sfifi
Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-401(5) , -405 (1978).

In this case it would

have been impossible for the jury to find defendant guilty of
thett by deception since they were never instructed on this
theory of theft.2

As Chief Justice Hall stated in his opinion,

only an instruction on embezzlement was given to the jury.

62

Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, (R. 153). Thus, assuming as this Court
must that the jury followed the instructions, it had to have
found that defendant lawfully obtained the money in order to find
him guilty of embezzlement.

The jury was given the following

instructions:
Under the laws of the state of Utah a
person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive the owner
thereof . . . .
•

. . .

When one intentionally and knowingly
appropriates the property of another lawfully
in his possession, to his personal use
without permission for such, the offense of
theft is complete • • • •
62 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, (R. 151, 153). While the word
•embezzlement" was never used in the jury instruction, the
instruction given and cited by this Court in its opinion clearly
defined the crime of embezzlement.
2 The prosecutor presented two theories of theft to the jury in
closing argument: 1) defendant stole the money when he failed to
put the money into a trust and instead placed it into his own
account, and 2) defendant stole the money when he used it for
purposes unrelated to the Temple Hills project. (R. 1206).
Although the prosecutor told the jury that theft occurred when
defendant placed the money'into his own account, the jury was
never instructed on this theory of theft and thus, the jury could
not have found that theft occurred at this time.
-6-

If defendant thought that some of the jurors could have
found him guilty of theft by deception, therefore placing the
crime outside of the statute of limitations, then defendant
should have requested an instruction on that theory.
UfllfiUr 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985).

5iai£_Xx

In light of defendants failure

to request such an instruction a conviction of theft by
deception was not possible and the only crime defendant could
have been convicted of was embezzlement, as this Court correctly
found.
Finally, defendant argues that even under an
embezzlement theory, the verdict was still improper.

Defendant

claims that six of the eight counts in the information charged
defendant with theft within a range of dates commencing in 1979
when prosecution was barred, and ending in 1980 when it was not
barred.

Defendant argues that because the information lists

dates outside of the statute of limitations, it is possible the
jury could have found him guilty of theft on one of those dates.
The State contends that the dates listed in the
information prior to October, 1979 merely proscribed the dates
when defendant obtained lawful possession of the money, an
element of embezzlement.

The crime of theft was not completed

until October, 1979 when defendant started to make unauthorized
expenditures.

Defendant overlooks the following language by

Chief Justice Hall:
The exhibit reflects the deposits of the
numerous investors, the expenditures, and the
purpose of each expenditure from August 30,
1979, through April 29, 1980, when the
account became overdrawn. None of the early
expenditures appear to have been made for
-7-

purposes not related to the Temple Hills
project. However, beginning in October 1979
and continuing until the account was
overdrawn, numerous expenditures were mtade
for purposes clearly unrelated to the Temple
Hills project.
62 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.

Because the original information was

filed on October 6# 1983 (R. 74), and defendant made the first
unauthorized expenditure on October 16, 1979, (SSLS 62 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 16) the information was filed within the statute of
limitations.^
Because defendant has failed to cite any material fact
or principle of law overlooked by this Court in its opinion, the
State urges this Court to deny the petition for rehearing.

Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
petition for rehearing should be denied and his conviction
affirmed.
DATED this

day of December, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK
Assistant Attorney General

3

UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-1-302(1) (1986) provides that a prosecution
for a felony must be commenced within four years after it is
committed.
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Defendant appeals his conviction of theli nl
funds invested in a condominium project.1
In July 1979, defendant acquired a tract of
land in Provo, Utah, for the purpose of developing it as a condominium project known as
Temple Hills. Beginning in August 1979, defendant proceeded to presell condominiums to
be built on the land. The project failed, the
land was lost, and all of the investors' funds
were primarily expended on defendant's unrelated ventures, which included a gold mine, a
real estate tfeney, t house, and • ihopping
mall.
On October 7, 1981, defendant was charged
by information with seven counts of theft by
deception.Apparently to avoid a statute of
limitations bar to the prosecution, the information waj amended to charge nine counts of
theft.* The information specifically relied upon
Utah Code Ann. f 76-4-404 (1978), theft
by unlawful taking or disposition, which
superseded several of the older definitions of
theft, including embezzlement.4
At a pretrial conference, it was resolved that
the statute of limitations was not an issue.
And at trial, the State presented its case on the
theory of embezzlement.
It was the State's evidence that as an incentive to investors, defendant offered to discount the price of each condominium purchased in an amount equal to the sum invested,
up to $22,200. Alternatively, defendant
offered to resell a purchased unit and return
to the Investor double his or her investment,
which could also be as much as $22,200. The
investors were told that the purpose of the
tales was to generate sufficient cash to complete the purchase of the Temple Hills land
and to begin construction of the condomin-

turns. Defendant also represented that the
investment opportunity was limited to about
twelve buyers, that the funds invested would
be held in trust until enough cash was on hand
to pay off the sum owing on the land, and
that the funds would not be expended except
to purchase the land or as up-front construction money fnr fhr Temple Hills development.
It was defendant's testimony at trial that he
did not hold the investors' funds in trust, nor
did he intend to do so. Defendant testified
that he believed the money was his to do with
as he pleased since the earnest money agree*
ment contained a nonrefundabihty clause.
It was stipulated for purposes of trial that
defendant sold a total of twenty-nine condominiums to some twenty-eight investors, for
an aggregate sum of $566,600, all of which
was spent by April 29, 1980, and that none of
the investors received any of their money
liar I
A l j | i e i j ( J S C 0 j ^jj 0 f l n t evidence, the trial
court dismissed one of the counts of theft for
lack of evidence, the alleged victim having
failed to appear and testify. The jury convicted on the remaining eight counts.
The trial court sentenced defendant to ti|in
concurrent terms of one to fifteen years and
ordered him to pay a fine of $1,000 on each
count. The trial court also ordered defendant
to make restitution to the persons who invested in the project, not to exceed $500,000.
The restitution amount was to be determined
(a) by agreement between defendant and the
Department of Corrections, (b) through civil
litigation, or (c) by further order of the court.
Defendant's motion for a new trial was
denied, and this appeal followed.
Defendant's first point on appeal is that the
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under the theft by unlawful taking or
disposition statute, and therefore the jury
must have convicted him of theft by deception, an offense time-barred by the statute of
limitations.
Section 76-6-404 provides, "A f>r i« I in
commits theft if he obtains or exeitiscs unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.* Subsection 76-6-401(4) defines 'obtains or
exercises unauthorized control" as including
conduct "heretofore defined or known as ...
embezzlement." Prior to the enactment of the
present criminal code, we held that the offense
of embezzlement was committed when one
entrusted with the property of another converted it to his or her own use.1 However, the
taking of property into possession by unlawful
means, such is by trick or deception, did not
constitute embezzlement.*
In the instant case, the Stite hiving elected
to prosecute on a theory of embezzlement, it
was not in dispute that defendant lawfully
obtained possession of the funds of the tnve-

Far eeapku I'tai C o4t ft • Mint lout mmrnh C o * • C V i AoooiatkNi StrvSc*
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ttort. What was in dispute was the authority
defendant hid to expend the funds entrusted
to him. Defendant denied wrongdoing of any
kind. He testified that the funds were lawfully
his to do with as he saw fit. On the other
band, it was the State's evidence that the
funds entrusted to defendant were only trt hr
expended on the Temple Hills project.
The jury was duly instructed on the elements of the offense of theft by unlawful takinf
or disposition in the following manner:
Under the laws of the state of
Utah a person commits theft if be
obtains or exercises control over the
property of another with a purpose
to deprive the owner thereof....
••••
When one In tent ion illy and
knowingly appropriates the propcrt)
of another lawfully in his potto
sion, to his persona) use without
permission for such, the offense of
theft is complete..
The case was presented, argued, and submined to the jury on the theory of embezzle*
Bitot, and no alternative or conflicting Instructions were given on the time-barred
offense of theft by deception. Defendant's
contention that the jury might have convicted
on the basis of an offense neither prosecuted
nor instructed upon is not supported by the
record and is therefore without merit.
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence relating to the specific acts of
embezzlement is similarly without merit. The
evidence was not in dispute as to the date and
the amount invested by each investor named in
the information and the date the sums were
deposited in defendant's operating account.
They arc as follows:

REPORTS

rawn, numerous expenditures were made for
purposes clearly unrelated to the Temple Hills
project. Expenditures which the jury could
have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt,
were made in breach of the investors* trust are
as follows:
p
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Brent C. Morris testified oi. u..*.. „i ttt
State. He had conducted an investigation and
had analyzed defendant's operating account.
Morri$ prepared a summary of the account
which was received in evidence as Exhibit 47.
The exhibit reflects the deposits of the nume- us investors, the expenditurea, and the
~- vc of ta;h expenditure from August 30,
through April 29, 1980, when the
account became overdrawn. None of the early
expenditures appear to have been made for
purposes not related to the Temple Hills
orojed. However, beginning in October 1979
;d continuing until the account was overd-

::W3 IIOTI I I

account
... - intends that the trial court
ai| defendant's motion for a new
trial before new counsel could obtain a transcript of the triaJ proceedings. The trial court
dmicd the motion for a new trial, stating that
there was sufficient evidence to submit the
Issue of guilt to the jury and that it was limply
trial strategy for former defense counsel not to
have offered evidence of which be had kr
wledge. Defendant does not now dispute it t
grounds for the ruling of the trial court.
Moreover, defendant fails to suppoi t
contention of error with any reference to the
record, and this Court's perusal of the record
fails to disdose any request for or denial of a
continuance or that defense counsel objected
to proceeding with the motion without more
time to prepare. For these reasons, we do not
consider the matter further and find no error
on the pan of the trial court,
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I
i 111 i KSCE REPORTS
II
rw- - .. , nnal point ol ti. v , « »h.i. the
(c) If the defendant object! to the
! in ordering the payment of
imposition, amount or distribution
fines &
"*n his contentions being: (1)
of the restitution, the court shall at
ihat th
r no inquiry of his
the time of sentencing allow him a
ability to pay; <2) that the trial court stated no
full hearing on such issue.
reasons for ordering restitution; (3) that the
(4) At tiled in subsect ion (J)
trial court ordered restitution to alleged
above:
victims not named in the information; and (4)
(a) 'Criminal activities* meanJ
that the manner of enforcing the payment of
any offense with respect to which
Iinn and forfeiture was unclear in its scope.
the defendant is convicted or any
It firs within the discretion of the trial court
other criminal conduct for which
to impose sentence or a combination of sentthe defendant admits responsibility
ences which may include the payment of a
to the sentencing court with or
fine, restitution, probation, or imprisonment.7
without an admission of committing
However, upon conviction of a crime which
the criminal conduct;
has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition
(b) 'Pecuniary damages01 memos
to any other sentence imposed, the trial court
•I! special damages, but not general
is statutorily mandated to order the payment
damages, which a person could
of restitution unless the court finds that restrecover against the defendant to a
itution is inappropriate. In this regard, Utah
civil action arising out of the facts
Code Ann. { 76 3-201 (Supp. 1981)
or events constituting the defen(amended 1983, 1986 A 1987) provided, in
dant's criminal activities and shall
pertinent part:
include, but not be limited to, the
money equivalent of property
(3Xa) When a person is adjudged
taken, destroyed, broken or otherguilty of criminal activity which has
w ise harmed,, and losses such as
resulted in pecuniary damages, in
earnings and medical expenses;
addition to any other sentence it
(c) "Restitution* means full,
may impose, the court shall order
partial or nominal payment for
that the defendant make restitution
pecuniary damages to a victim,
to the victim or victims of the
including insured damages;
offense of which the defendant has
(d) "Victim" means any person
pleaded guilty, is convicted, or to
whom the court determines has
the victim of any other criminal
suffcrcd pecuniary damages as a
conduct admitted by the defendant
result of the defendant's criminal
to the sentencing court unless the
activities; "victim" shall not include
court in applying the criteria in
any coparticipant in the defendant's
section 3(b) of this chapter, findi
criminal
activities.
that restitution is inappropriate If
the court determines that restitution
Subsection 76~3-201(3K*) was amended in
is appropriate or inappropriate, the
1983 to require that trial courts make the
court shall make the reasons for the
reasons for restitution orders part of their
decision a pa ;rt: of the court record,
written orders.* Thus, in this case, it was error
for the trial court not to set forth in writing its
reasons for ordering restitution. However, the
(b) In determining whether or not
record reflects that the error was not prejudi. to order restitution, or restitution
which is complete, partial or
cial.*
nominal, the court shall take into
Defendant lodged no objection to the impaccount: (i) The financial rcsou
osition, amount, or distribution of the restitrces of the defendant and the
ution ordered. Nor did he request a hearing on
burden that payment of restitution
the issue. Instead, he focused only upon the
will impose, with due regard to the
merits of his candidacy for probation, conteother obligations of the defendant;
nding that freedom would enhance his ability
to make restitution. He thus waived the right
(ii) The ability of the defe ndi.nl
he had to challenge the order of restitution.
to pay restitution on an installment
This is clearly a case where it was approprbasis or on other conditions to be
; to ordet restitution. Defendant stipulated
fixed by the court;
i he had luipated $566,600 of the Tcmpk
(iii) The rehabilitative effect on
.. JJ inv« ?* funds, and the evidence was
the defendant of the payment of
that he had acquired substantial assets consisting of a house purchased from Dr. Jeffrey
restitution and flic method of
interests in a shopping mall, Western Amerpayment; and
ican Mining, and mining equipment; and
(iv) Other circumstances which }n
deposits totalling $334,000 not related to the
the opinion of the court shall make
Temple Hills project. Defendant also claimed
rest it ution inappropriate.
¥m c*«pkt« Ufa* C*6t A«»outK>«§, coftsalt Co4t*Ca's A*»<X*fio« Strvfc*
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to have had a personal net worth of $200,000
in 1979, and at the time of trial, he was
employed as a consultant for Tel-America.
Defendant*! contention that the trial court
erred in ordering restitution to victims not
named in the information is similarly without
merit. Subsection 76-3-201(4)(d) defi
•victim' as any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a
result of the defendant's criminal conduct.
Also, 'pecuniary damages" is defined as all
special damages which a person could recover
against a defendant in a civil action arising out
of the same facts supporting his criminal
prosecution. The fact that defendant stipulated
to having caused pecuniary damage in the
amount of $566,600 to twenty-eight Temple
Hills investors is dispositive of thii issue.
Defendant's remaining contention, that the
scope of the restitution order is unclear, is
obviated by the clarity of the language cev
ained in the order itself:
3. The Defendant is ordered
make restitution to the individuals
who invested money in the Temple
Hills condominium project. The
amount of restitution shall be det
ermined by: a) agreement between
the Defendant and the Division of
Corrections, b) as determined
through civil litigation, or c) b>
further order of the Court. P
amount of restitution shall i
exceed $500,000.00.
It is thus definite and certain that defendant is
to pay the pecuniary damages suffered by his
victims, not to exceed $500,000. The flexibility
in the order which permits the individual
amounts of restitution to be determined either
by agreement, by litigation, or by order of the
court comports with good sentencing practice
and protects the interests of all concerned. The
order does not exceed the authority prescribed
by law, nor does it constitute an abuse of the
trial court's discretion.1* Consequently,, we do
not disturb it.
The conviction and judgment ar affirm* d
WE CONCUR:
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Ju*..~.
Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
la violation of Utah Code Am, | 7+4-404
Uuh Uxfc Ann. { 7*4403 *:ri,.
I. Set Utah Code Ann 17*4403 (1971).
J See Utah Code Ana. | | 7t-4105
403,-404(1*71).
I. Sute v. Taylor, 14 Uuh ..
152.333(1963).
• /d.an09,J7lr\2dai354,
7. Sec Uuh Code Aim. I 76 * :
i Ml) (amended 1913 A 19t6).

-

I . Act of Feb, 4, I9S3, iii 11 1 1, 19S3 Utah
Laws 396,197.
9. See Sute i "i i mi M. JPJd 611, 612 (Uuh
1985).
10. See Sute v. \ (iih TJi
2d 917, 968 (Utah

1986); Sute v. Ocimd. »4 P.2d 885, 186 (Utah
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Honorable Philip R. Fishier
ATTORNEYS:
Olen M. Richman, Sail Lale City, im
Appellant
J. Anthony Eyr# *al» I n*1 Citi fine
Respondent
HALL, Chief Jastkt:
Plaintiff appeals the summary judgment of
dismissal of his claim for medical malpractice.
The only viable issue on appeal is whether the
trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs
claim was barred by the four-year statute of
repose contained to I J tab Code Ann. f 78li-4(1987).t

In May 1973, defendant performed corrective surgery on plaintiffs ankle necessitated
by an injury sustained in an automobile accident. On February 19, 1982, plaintiff allegedly
discovered that the surgery had been negligently performed and commenced this lawsuit
with the filing of a complaint on December
28, 1982.
On appeal, plaintiff advance* the mune
arguments presented to the trial court. He
contends that his complaint was timely fikd
within two years of the date his injury was
discovered, and in reliance upon our decision
in Foil r. BtUingtr,* be contends that his
claim should not have bees extinguished
before it was discovered.
Utah Code Ann. f 71-14-4 (1987)
(effective April 1, 1976) provides, in pertinent

- >• .
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^ N o m A j p f m c t | c e ftCtjon against
health care provider may be
ught unless It it commenced
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